This is taken from Chapter 2 of the forthcoming first-ever English translation of Marcel De Corte’s book on the cardinal virtue of prudence. We kindly thank the translator, Inez Storck, for allowing us to publish this chapter. We are currently proofreading the book.
The Path to Happiness and Wisdom
For St. Thomas, prudence is “the most necessary virtue for the life of man.”[1] It is a good counselor in matters relating to man’s entire life and the ultimate end of human life.[2] It is “the art of right conduct.”[3] “There can be no moral virtue without it.”[4] Operating in each virtue, it is at work in all of them sicut sol aliqualiter influit in omnia corpora,[5] that is, just as the sun sheds its light on all bodies. Similar to a charioteer, who with his two feet firmly set on the floorboard of the chariot, guides it to the finish line of the race, prudence directs all the virtues to their realization.[6] Its main role is to govern the life of man.[7] In a compact formula, cited a thousand times, the unfathomable depth of which we need to comprehend, it is the recta ratio agibilium, that is, right reason applied to practice.
If this is the case, it is important in the first place to recall what human actions are for St. Thomas.
Every act is defined by the end to which it is directed. This end is always a good. Even if an act is directed to something evil, that evil is still held to be a good by the author of the act. The good and the end are thus identical. This is a fact immediately grasped by the intellect. Yet as there are a multitude of actions, there will be a multitude of ends and goods. Experience shows that these ends and goods have among themselves relationships of subordination and hierarchy: a person pursues one specific end in view of another, which in turn functions as a springboard for a third object desired, and so on, up to the end point, which constitutes the final goal of man. All the ends connected to each other are thus in the last analysis linked to an end which is not willed in view of another, which on the contrary is willed for itself, which is commonly called happiness or beatitude. “All men want to be happy, even those who are going to be hanged,” writes Pascal[8], echoing the wisdom of the ages expressed by Cicero: Beatos nos omnes esse volumus[9]
What then is that happiness without which human action is unintelligible, if not something in a state of completion, a state where nothing is lacking to man and his fulfillment, having nothing to do with what in him is accidental[10], transitory, incidental, or extrinsic, but concerning what is essential, permanent, universal, intrinsically proper to him, that is, to his own manner of functioning, that which distinguishes him from all other living beings: reason. The human act is thus a rational act. However, since reason can be considered either in its proper activity, which is to know, or inasmuch as it directs the irrational part of man, it has two kinds of operations: what we call intellectual operations and moral operations. The intellectual virtues, understanding, knowledge, artistry or craftsmanship, and wisdom[11]are perfections of man’s ability to reason. The moral virtues, justice, fortitude, and temperance, and the retinue of virtues revolving around them, come into being when reason penetrates the irrational part of man. Where then can we find happiness?
“One understands by happiness,” writes St. Thomas, “nothing other than the perfect good of an intellectual nature, which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses.”[12] Happiness is thus defined by an act and by the object of this act. It consists in a lasting, perfect satisfaction, involving a relationship with the object which produces the satisfaction. Happiness thus has two aspects, inseparable from each other, the objective: the reality the possession of which obtains happiness; and the subjective: the delight felt by the agent in the act of possessing this reality. The reality which makes us completely happy is objective beatitude; all the acts through which we enjoy it, and the enjoyment itself, constitute subjective beatitude. The reality is the cause of the happiness; the delight is its essence; the operation or set of operations which obtains happiness for us is the means of attaining to that reality which will be for us our supreme good. Obviously subjective beatitude is subordinated to objective beatitude, sicut finis sub fine, that is, as an end subordinated to another end.[13] It follows from this that subjective beatitude, the only one which we are able to experience, is necessarily an imperfect participation in objective perfect beatitude.
Experience is sufficiently illustrative of this, since “if happiness is the perfect, sufficient good, it excludes every evil and fulfills every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded, since the present life is subjected to many unavoidable evils: ignorance, on the part of the intellect; inordinate affection, on the part of the appetite; and many afflictions, on the part of the body…Similarly, we are unable, in this life, to satiate the desire for the good. For man naturally wants the good which he possesses to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life are fleeting, since life itself passes away, this life which we naturally desire, which we would want to possess abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death. It follows that it is impossible to have true happiness in this life.”[14]
Moreover, “it is impossible for the happiness of man to lie in any created good. For happiness is the perfect good which completely satisfies the appetite; it would not be the final end if there remained something else to be desired. Now the object of the will, that is, man’s appetite, is the universal good, as the object of the intellect is universal truth. Hence it is evident that nothing can satisfy man’s will except the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone, because every creature has goodness by participation. Thus God alone can satisfy the will of man…Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness.”[15] On the other hand, we are unable to love the perfections of the Supreme Being without knowing Him, without representing Him to ourselves by means of concepts, which we draw from the world experienced by the senses. It follows that our concepts are inadequate when applied to this immaterial, simple, infinite Being who is God. The love for Him that we profess will always then be imperfect, precarious, unstable, inconstant. Grace itself, if it surpasses human nature, will only allow our love to attain to God through the darkness of supernatural faith. To possess God as He is in Himself and to participate everlastingly in His intimate life, man must wait for the life to come when God in His infinite generosity will be simultaneously the object (id) of his knowledge and love and the means (quo) by which he attains to them.[16]
Yet man does not cease to pursue happiness in his present life. The problem which arises is then to know what kind of happiness can be attained by man in the course of his earthly life. Attainable happiness would be real happiness, the deficiencies of which grace here below not only makes up for; it also prepares relative perfection for its conversion into absolute perfection, wholly accorded in the kingdom of God, which is not of this world. Gratia non tollit naturam, that is, grace does not suppress nature. The natural is the foundation of the supernatural. It is the bonum essentialissimum[17], the good most conformed to human nature. Though grace is on a higher level than nature, it is more important for man to live according to nature than according to grace: Homini est essentialius esse naturae quam esse gratiae, quamvis esse gratiae sit dignius[18]. It is wrong to uphold the gratuitous crowning of the human being while taking away from him his foundation. As Jorge Laporta writes, the gift of grace, far from overthrowing, abolishing, or replacing the natural order of things, complete in itself, establishes it. Grace “does not suppress the natural in order to replace it with an unexpected economy. On the contrary, the supernatural only crowns the work, and gives it perfect balance.”[19] “For Thomas…, the natural desire to see God existing in every intelligent creature is above all an intellectual, voluntary act…As an intelligent being, [man] was made for this. He knows nothing about this, he denies it, he loses his time looking elsewhere for his happiness? Nevertheless, naturaliter appetit visionem[20], that is, his being is constituted to behold the supreme Truth.”[21] “But if this destiny is attainable, it is impossible for a created substance to achieve it through its own power…: an intelligent creature is defined by an end that it cannot attain through its own resources.”[22] Such is the glorious secret of human nature: “a tremendous disproportion between what this being desires above all, irresistibly, often unconsciously,” because he was born from God and his beginning is his end as well, “and that which this same creature can hope for and determine to win. A disparity, a mark of greatness!…The more grace appears to be gratuitous…the more nature itself stands out as great…For the incredible gift of God does nothing other than complete this humble creature…: gratia est perfectio naturae”[23]
“For we are his offspring,” Paul had proclaimed [Acts 17:28], after the Greek poet, in the Aeropagus at Athens.[24] The seal of God is permanent. But it is impossible for us to fill up the space within us, designed for the infinite, of our own power, since this space is placed within a finite, limited substance, incapable on its own of receiving an infinite substance. The most basic common sense cries out: to bridge the distance which separates the finite from the infinite, God’s gratuitous gift is necessary. Sartre had an inkling of this, when, with one last grimace at the end of his tiresome inquiry on Being and Nothingness, he wrote that man is haunted by his desire to become God, “but this is a futile passion.” [25]
Nothing could be more mistaken, not only on the level of grace, but also on the level of nature itself, where man in all his actions tends towards his absolute final end, which is God, just as a falling stone is drawn to the center of the earth. If happiness is a specifically human act[26], it reaches its level of perfection in man in the act in which his intellect is most fully itself, that is, wisdom (sophia)[27], which encompasses all aspects of the contemplative activity of the soul, beginning with the comprehension of the first principles of knowing (intellectus) in their radiant truth and the demonstration of the first causes of being and the ultimate principle of all reality (scientia), up to the ensemble of consequences which follow from the universal primacy of these principles.[28] The proper function of wisdom is to contemplate the order in the world and to comprehend the presence of God in all creatures, reflected in the mind as in a mirror. This is why wisdom is called contemplative or speculative.[29] The happiness it brings is sufficient unto itself and is sought for itself, “because it produces nothing outside of the act of contemplation, while all other activities of man bring us more or less significant advantages, distinguished from the activities themselves.”[30] Far from being “useless,” this “passion” allows man to ascend to the vision of the relation of the parts to the whole, of consequences to their cause, and of all things to their end, in which consists the harmony of the world.[31] This is the pinnacle of happiness: videre dispositionem divinae providentiae est maxime delectabile,[32] that is, to contemplate the order in the universe wrought by divine providence is exceedingly delightful. Nothing surpasses this joy born of the contemplation of the truth, gaudium de veritate,[33] which continually brings us back to God as its source.[34]
However, as Aristotle says, an exclusively contemplative life “is too lofty for the human condition, since man insofar as he is a man does not live in this way, but insofar as a divine element is present in him.”[35] The man who gives himself to contemplation does not live strictly speaking in a human manner, but like higher substances whose nature is purely intellectual. He stands in a kind of continuum with angels[36] and, through grace, with God[37], very imperfectly, it is true, and in keeping with the weak power imparted to his intelligence, in homine autem imperfecte et quasi participative[38]. However, this weak element is superior to all the rest: et tamen istud parvum est majus omnibus aliis quae in homine sunt.[39] Mary has chosen the better part and it will not be taken from her [Luke 10:42]. The contemplative life, absolutely speaking (simpliciter), is superior to the active life. Nothing prevents one thing from being in itself (secundum se) of a higher value than another thing, while being, from a particular point of view (secundum quid) surpassed by that other thing.[40] “If it is true that the intellect is preeminently man himself”[41] and “if man, when he lives in accord with his intellect, assumes the kind of life most appropriate to him”[42], “it obviously follows that he who gives himself to the contemplation of the truth is happy to the highest degree, as far as a man can be said to be happy in this life.”[43]
St. Thomas, like Aristotle, considers that the contemplative life based on the activities of the intellect alone (the orientation of which is elevated by the theological virtues) is necessary for the happiness of man. One should not listen to the masses who, following the poet Simonides[44] urge mortal man to enjoy only perishable nourishment. “Man must (debet) tend toward immortality to the extent that he can, and, in keeping with what is in his power, live according to the intellect, the most noble of human faculties, its immortal and divine portion.”[45] Yet since man is made of body and soul, and human nature is characterized by both the senses and the intellect, the life apportioned to him (vita homini commensurata) is seen to consist in the governing of the activities of the body and senses by his reason (videtur consistere in hoc quod homo secundum rationem ordinet affectiones et operationes sensitivas et corporales).[46] Such is the moral life in the domain of the human: circa humana.[47]
Nec hoc est contra id quod supra dictum est: there is no contradiction between this affirmation and the primacy of the contemplative life[48]: “One goes from the active life to the contemplative life in the order of time (secundum ordinem generationis), but one returns from the contemplative life to the active life by way of direction (per viam directionis), that is, in order to submit the active life to the direction of the contemplative life.”[49] The moral life governed by prudence has priority for us (quoad nos) over the contemplative life. However because man is not only ordered to the fulfillment of his human nature, but also to the contemplation of the divine, it is a question of a temporal and temporary priority: in disciplining the passions of the soul and submitting them to the order of reason, the active life is a preparation for the contemplative life, always imperfect before ending in the life to come, but in and of itself of an excellence as perfect as is possible here below.[50] By nature, the higher use of reason, which is contemplation, has the same relationship to the lower use of reason, in charge of action, as a husband has to his wife, who should be directed by him, according to the doctrine of St. Augustine in On the Trinity.[51] The active life, which takes place in time, is then actuated and directed by the contemplative life towards an end which surpasses it: the fullness of the contemplation of God at the end of the present life.[52]
Between prudence which governs the active life and directs all the moral virtues, and wisdom, which governs the contemplative life and all the intellectual virtues, the ties are as close as possible. Prudence considers what leads to happiness, and wisdom considers the object of happiness itself.[53] The particular greatness of a virtue is measured by its object. Wisdom, which considers the highest cause, which is God, by which it judges subordinate causes, imposes its judgment on prudence, which concerns human matters. It would be otherwise if “man were the greatest of the things in the world”; such is not the case, as Aristotle himself states.[54] Thus wisdom must govern prudence, which must then prescribe for men how they ought to attain wisdom, even in its most practical form, prudence in politics. “Prudence leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, like the doorkeeper of the king.”[55] As a result, wisdom is a magnetic pole which attracts prudence, its radiance pervading prudence and drawing it near. Yet in accord with the fundamental principle according to which what is last in the order of execution is first in the order of intention, prudence itself is the principle of wisdom. Wisdom is the actuating force of prudence in two ways. The first relates to the status of the creature that is man, who like every being which comes forth from the divine goodness, tends towards returning to it, animated by a natural love of God. The second concerns the very nature of prudence, which, to regulate the conduct of human life, requires from the start adherence to a general principle, from which will follow particular, concrete acts. We recognize synderesis[56] here, the highest law of practical reasoning, a superior habitus[57] “which contains the principles of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions.”[58]
Now the natural law is nothing other than the participation of the human creature in the eternal law which exists in God and governs all created things.[59] The first principles deriving from it, self evident, are the counterpart in the practical order of the first principles in speculative reasoning. To the principle of identity[60] in the speculative order corresponds the principle of doing good and avoiding evil in the field of action, and also, adds St. Thomas, a certain general concept of life (aliqua scientia practica[61]), a knowledge of the true ends of man and his destiny. St. Thomas did not analyze in detail the elements of this general concept of life, knowledge of which was in his time widespread in all minds, even the most uncultured, in varying degrees through the agency of the Church and the Catholic state. We will see below that these latter resembled each other in accepting and respecting the common good and the laws which embodied it. Without the existence of a stable social order in which from generation to generation a lived wisdom is transmitted, fully recognized and practiced by the ruling elites and reflected through them in the people, prudence disappears and gives way to substitutes which are disruptive of human conduct. Causae ad invicem sunt causae[62]: wisdom found throughout society governs prudence and prudence directs the moral virtues towards that very wisdom which prudence reinforces. Nothing is compartmentalized or sealed off in the spiritual order.
The active life of the human being composed soul and body is then for all who possess a human nature or for most of them (omnibus vel pluribus habentibus humanam naturam) the seat of human happiness attainable here below.[63] It is facilitated by prudence and the moral virtues, of which prudence is the guide. Virtutes compositi, proprie loquando, sunt humanae, inquantum homo est compositus ex anima et corpore, unde et vita quae est secundum has, id est secundum prudentiam et virtutem moralem, est humana, quae dicitur activa. Et per consequens felicitas, quae in hac vita consistit, est humana. Sed vita et felicitas speculativa, quae est propria intellectus, est separata et divina.[64] Contemplation itself cannot be without these virtues, since it presupposes the moral virtues associated with prudence as a prior disposition (dispositive).[65] Prudence is, from this point of view, the human virtue par excellence. It is prudence which perfects human nature and directs it with firmness and ease toward what Maurras admirably calls “the summit of wisdom.”[66]
[1] Summa Theologiae (afterwards ST) I-II, q 57, art. 5, c.
[2] ST, I-II, q. 57, art. 4, ad. 3; art. 5, ad. 1.
[3] ST I-II, q. 58, art. 2, ad. 1.
[4] ST I-II, q. 58, art. 4, c.
[5] ST II-II, q. 47, art. 5, ad. 2.
[6] It is the motor [Latin, driving force] and the aurigo virtutum [charioteer of the virtues] according to ST III, Suppl., q. 2, art. 4, c, which adds: ideo quaelibet cum motu proprio virtus moralis habet aliquid de motu prudentiae [Consequently, each moral virtue in addition to its proper activity has something of the activity of prudence]. [Translation of Latin by translator.]
[7] ST II-II, q. 47, art. 13, c.
[8] Free citation from Pensées (1670). [Tr.]
[9] We wish good men to be happy always, Tusculan Disputations, c. 45 BC. [Tr.]
[10] In the philosophical sense. [Tr.]
[11] See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, VI for a discussion of the intellectual virtues. [Tr.]
[12] ST I, q. 26, art. 1, c.
[13] Commentary on Sentences [hereafter Sentences]II, D. 38, q. 1, art. 2.
[14] ST I-II, q. 5, art. 3, c.
[15] ST I-II, q. 2, art. 8, c.
[16] Summa contra Gentiles III, 51.
[17] The most essential good. [Tr.]
[18] Nature belongs more to man’s essence than grace, although grace is more excellent. [Tr.] ST Supplement, q. 49, art. 3, c.
[19] Jorge Laporta, La destinée de la nature humaine selon saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, 1965, p. 124.
[20] He naturally desires the vision [of God]. [Tr.]
[21] Laporta, p. 43.
[22] Ibid., p. 59. Cf. p. 61: “Every intellectual creature is defined by a destiny inaccessible to him through the power of his nature alone.”; also pp. 95 and 100.
[23] Grace is the perfection of nature. [Tr.] Ibid., p. 127 and Sentences I, D. 3, q. 1, art. 1.
[24] The phrase begins, “as even some of your own poets have said”; some scholars hold that Paul was referring to the Cretan poet Epimedides, sixth century BC, an important figure in Athenian tradition. [Tr.] Acts 17:28.
[25] 1943. [Tr.]
[26] According to Thomas, happiness is an act; otherwise it would be pure potentiality. See ST I-II, q. 3, art. 2, c. [Tr.]
[27] Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Marietti edition [henceforth CNE], 2134.
[28] Ibid., 1175, 1177, 1181, 1182, 1190, 2086, etc.
[29] Sentences III, D. 35, q. 1, art. 2.
[30] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics [henceforth Nic. Eth.] X, 7, 1177 b and CNE 2097.
[31] Ibid. Also ST I, q, 42, art. 3, c: ordo semper dicitur per comparationem ad aiquod principium [Order always has reference to some principle. [Tr.]]; ST I-II, q. 1, art. 4, c.; De Veritate, q. 5, art. 1, ad 9; ST I, q. 21, art. 1, ad 3 and q. 47, art. 3, c.
[32] Aquinas, Commentary on the Psalms, 26 (27).
[33] ST I-II, q. 3, art. 4, c; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on 1 Timothy, 3, L. 3.
[34] Aquinas, Compendium of Theology, 107.
[35] Nic. Eth. X, 7, 1177b; CNE, 2105-2110, pertinent to the text which follows above.
[36] Sentences III, D. 35, q. 1, art. 2, quaestiuncula 2, ad 1.
[37] ST I-II, q. 3, art. 5, c.
[38] But in man imperfectly and by participation. [Tr.] CNE, 2110.
[39] Ibid.
[40] ST II-II, q. 182, art. 1, c.
[41] Nic. Eth. X, 7 in fine.
[42] CNE, 2109.
[43] CNE, 2110.
[44] Simonides of Ceos (c. 556-468 BC), Greek lyric poet. [Tr.]
[45] CNE, 2107.
[46] CNE, 2105.
[47] CNE, 2106.
[48] CNE, 2110.
[49] ST II-II, q. 182, art. 4, ad 2.
[50] ST II-II, q. 182, art. 3, c
[51] ST II-II, q. 182, art. 4, c.
[52] Ibid.
[53] ST I-II, q. 66, art. 5, ad 2.
[54] ST I-II, q. 66, art. 5, ad 1.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Self-evident truths in the field of moral conduct. [Tr.]
[57] Meaning “habit”; the plural is also habitus.
[58] ST I-II, q. 94, art. 1, ad 2.
[59] ST I-II, q. 91, art. 2, c.
[60] According to which a thing is identical to itself; every object exists as something specific, and cannot exist as something else. [Tr.]
[61] Some practical knowledge. [Tr.]
[62] Causes are mutually causes for each other, referring to the mutual interdependence of causes. [Tr.]
[63] CNE, 170.
[64] Now virtues of the composite being, properly speaking, are human inasmuch as man is composed of soul and body. Hence life in accord with these, namely, prudence and moral virtue, is also human and is called the active life. Consequently happiness consisting in this kind of life is human. But contemplative life and contemplative happiness, which are proper to the intellect, are separate and divine. [Tr.] CNE, 2115.
[65] ST II-II, q. 180, art. 2, c.
[66] Charles Maurras (1868-1952), French journalist, politician, and poet, the principal exponent of the monarchist, anti-revolutionary movement, L’Action française. The quote is from his collection of poetry La Balance intérieure (1952). [Tr.]